While policymakers use taxes for the regulation of the economy, tax authorities constantly monitor the amount of revenues from diff erent taxes, and sometimes the tax benefi ts in use. However, the author believes that policymakers neglect the feedback mechanism, off ered by the tax statistics -the signal function of the taxes. Th e author shows, on the example of tax policies and VAT statistics, how these outline the trends in the development of the Eurasian Economic Union -signs of tax competition, dependence on import and tax loss due to policy gap. Th e paper further suggests the possible course of action for the policymakers.
Introduction
Th e researchers derived four main functions of the taxes (sometimes referred to as "four R's"): raising revenue, redistributing wealth, re-pricing economic alternatives and representing the interests of people (or certain groups among them) (Cobham 2005) . Th e fi ft h function, cited by some who follow the Keynesian approach, is regulating the economy (Licari and Meier 2000; Jones 2007 ).
Taxes may also execute other functions, for example, information. A number of researchers showed that policymakers may bring certain information to the producers or consumers using tax policy and related mass-media campaigns and thus infl uence their behavior. Barigozzi and Villeneuve (2006) developed a theoretical model, showing how the representative consumer changes their choices aft er the implementation of a particular excise policy (including both changes in tax burden and respective media coverage explaining the reasons for the policy). Th ey show that the "costly message" (increased tax or tax incentive itself) is more informative than the "propaganda" (e.g. media information about consequences of consumption of tobacco or alcohol or warning labels). Brockwell (2014) , on the other hand, performed an empirical analysis of US data for 1988 -2012, examining changes in the consumption of excisable goods (tobacco, alcoholic beverages, sugar and confectionary, household energy and motor fuel) due to increases of the relevant excise taxes. He confi rmed the signifi cant eff ect of taxes on tobacco, electricity and motor fuel consumption. Th e OECD (2000) also mentioned that the tax policy and certain tax measures (statutory tax rates, tax incentives for investors etc.) have a signal function, i.e. they convene a message on the benefi cial nature of the tax regime. In other words, the changes in tax burden may lead to more signifi cant changes in economic behavior than producers' price changes or relevant "propaganda" in media -this is called the "signaling eff ect" of taxation.
It is worth mentioning that apart from the reaction of the taxpayers on the particular tax-policy measures, the researchers of tax-signaling devices consider two other areas: tax-based changes in the fi nancial behavior of fi rms (Amihud and Murgia 1997) and the impact of tax measures on tax planning and tax-evasion activities (Franzoni 1998; Saavedra 2016; Dias et al. 2016) . Again, these works considered the impact of changes in the tax and compliance burden on the behavior of the private economic agents.
However, taxes are a two-edge tool: the tax authorities register payers of various taxes (and therefore record their numbers and types) and collect and process tax returns (and therefore record tax bases, allowances in use, tax rates applied, tax incidences etc.), thus accumulating and processing a big volume of data within a rather restricted timeframe. Th e tax authorities use such tax statistics for tax-control purposes (e.g. risk-based selection of taxpayers to undergo tax control), but in many cases they also publish them in aggregated form. Th e authorities are able to update such statistics on a regular basis 1 , making the analysis feasible and valuable for the policymakers.
Th ese facts suggest that the taxation also functions as an information subsystem of the public administration: the tax regulations and the information on economic events are its infl ow, and the information on taxpayers and the results of their activities (number of taxpayers, amount of taxes collected, amount of tax benefi ts used etc.) is its outfl ow. Th e comparative analysis of tax statistics of the neighboring countries may be used to assess not only the effi ciency of their respective tax reforms, but also relevant economic tendencies. In addition, the politicians of the regional economic blocks oft en promote the cooperation in various matters, including certain aspects of tax harmonization, but the practice does not necessarily follow these talks -and the comparison of legal developments (as well as tax-policy documents) provides an important insight in countries' intentions. However, the literature analysis showed that the comparative analysis across regions or countries usually covers legal developments in tax pronouncements and the comparison of tax revenues (Tanzi et al. 2008; Petersen 2010) or the eff ect of taxation on FDI or other factors of production (Strasky and Pashinova 2012; Tyutyuryukov 2015b) . Adamczyk (2015) is a rare example of estimating VAT eff ectiveness (based on VAT Revenue Ratio), in particular showing exchangeability between the noncompliance gap and the policy gap and the negative impact of tax preferences and the general eff ectiveness of VAT in EU.
Th is paper intends to further cover this gap and examine which useful information the tax statistics could provide for policy-makers.
Goal and methods
Th e Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and its predecessors consistently aimed at the harmonization of indirect taxation in intra-union trade, primarily focusing on value added tax (VAT). EAEU Member States impose VAT on the transactions with an absolute majority of goods, which makes VAT an almost omnipresent tax in this region. Th us, the statistics on VAT should correlate with the trends in countries' internal and external trade. In addition, VAT in EAEU Member States is based on the same principles, its administration employs very similar mechanisms, and it is regulated at the central level and contributes to the central budget of the countries, which allows a comparative analysis of developments.
Th e above dictated the main idea of this paper: the analysis of legal and statistical data on tax-policy decisions in the VAT area and their outcomes highlights the trends in economy and can support or disavow the policy statements with respect to the tax systems, as well as provide grounds for fi scal policy decisions. Th is article suggests an instrument of policy analysis based on fi scal information and uses it for drawing conclusions on the policy lessons for the local policymakers. Based on this the author determined the following research questions: 1) While EAEU Member States oft en report on VAT harmonization, do their domestic tax policies and developments support these statements ?
2) How may VAT statistics be interpreted as signaling about trends in economy ?
Th e object of this research is the tax data from Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) Member States -Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Russia (both publicly available statistics and legal pronouncements). Th e amounts of VAT proceeds are taken in percentage of GDP to off set the diff erences in the sizes of economies and infl ation processes, which happen in all countries of the region, but at diff erent paces. Th e subject of this research is economic and administrative processes associated with the development and implementation of the tax policies.
Signals of VAT policies within EAEU: harmonization, divergence, competition ?
To achieve the strategic country development goals, the governments prepare and implement policies in particular sectors, including the tax policy. At the level of EAEU and its predecessors a very explicit framework exists for partial tax harmonization, covering three areas, in chronological order:
• • VAT on intra-EAEU cross-border trade with goods and services -since 2008. Th e agreement on principles of levying indirect taxes [2008] and protocols to it established the following: export shall be subject to 0 % VAT rate or exemption from VAT, import shall be subject to VAT in the country of import ("destination country" principle), VAT rates on imported goods shall not exceed VAT rates on the similar goods produced domestically; and
• Taxation of labor income -since 2014. Treaty on establishing EAEU (2014) provided for the use of the "domestic" tax rate for employees who are tax residents of other Member States. However, non-employment income of non-residents may be subject to special (higher) domestic rates.
EAEU Member States introduced the respective amendments to their tax legislation, with some omissions, however (for more details in English, see Tyutyuryukov 2016; Ponomareva 2016) . But how did the countries incorporate such harmonization steps into their domestic tax policies ?
While EAEU aims at the creation of a common market, its Member States are sovereign countries and develop their own policies independently from one another and from EAEU bodies. Even the high-level comparative analysis of the goals of EAEU Member States' tax policies shows that there is a long road to creating a levelled and effi cient common market.
Th e Government of Armenia published an overall strategy for the country development for 2014 -2025, which includes a section on Public Revenue Policy (Government of the Republic of Armenia 2014). It states the prior directions of the Armenian tax policy as an expansion of the tax base and the creation of a favorable business environment. From 2014 onwards the goals are enhancement of the fi scal function of the taxes (which is currently underused) while implementing horizontal and vertical equity principles as well as the improvement of tax-administration ef-fi ciency. In particular, the Armenian policy is to eliminate VAT exemptions, as well as to expand the list of excisable goods, in order to develop capital-gain taxation and wealth taxation. Th e Armenia Development Strategy specifi cally mentions the harmonization of domestic rates with those applied by other CIS countries so as to improve the tax competitiveness of Armenia (the current Armenian and Belarusian standard VAT rates, 20 %, are the highest in EAEU).
In 2004, the Council of the Ministers of Belarus approved the National Strategy of the Sustainable Social and Economic Development till 2020, which outlines the development of the common legal environment and equal tax conditions in Belarus and Russia to enhance regional integration. Belarus also adopted the Program of activities of the Government for 2011 -2015, which sets, among other things, several goals with respect to taxation (decrease of tax burden, improvement of the country's Doing Business ranking, improvement of certain areas of income taxation). Th e offi cials of the Ministry of Finance 2 in the interviews disclose that they aim at shift ing the tax burden to high-margin activities (such as fi nancial services and de-facto state-owned monopolies) and improved tax control (to counteract tax law abuse) (Kiyko 2015) . Earlier they cited simplifi cation of tax administration by abolishment of certain taxes (Krapivina 2010 ) and revision of ineffi cient tax benefi ts (Chumakova 2011 ).
Kazakhstan does not operate a single tax-policy document -the President and the Government (the main domestic policy-makers) express their policy goals in their addresses. In "Strategy Kazakhstan -2050" the President N. Nazarbayev focused on a simplifi cation of tax reporting, an increase of tax-benefi ts effi ciency and an expansion of stimulation and destimulation features (Tyutyuryukov 2015a ). In the current program document, "100 Specifi c Steps of Further State-Building", Mr. Nazarbayev planned for tax administration (its integration with customs administration, which is important for indirect taxes) and the improvement of tax collection (replacement of VAT with sales tax, introduction of overall personal-income-tax reporting, optimization of tax regimes) (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda 2015) . Th e Government and the National Bank of Kazakhstan planned to use taxation to stimulate economic development and the infl ow of investments, as well as the revision of tax benefi ts (Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2013 Kazakhstan , 2014 . Th e Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy and Budgetary Planning had to work on an improvement of tax administration, interaction among public bodies on tax-related issues and an increase of tax burden in cases of excises and taxation of luxurious items (Tyutyuryukov 2015a) .
Th e Kyrgyz Republic aims at sustainable development, but its fi scal policy focuses on an increasing share of tax revenues allocated to local budgets, an improve-ment of tax collection and administration and a shift from taxation of movable property to excises on petrol fuel (President of the Kyrgyz Republic 2013).
Th e Russian Ministry of Finance, while planning tax policy, pursues two goals: budget sustainability and support of entrepreneurial and investment activity (which should ensure the tax competitiveness of the country). To achieve these, it plans to increase tax-system effi ciency, to freeze tax burden for non-resource industries and to counteract tax-base erosion and profi t-shift ing (Ministry of Finance of Russia 2014). Later it also included the assessment of tax-benefi ts effi ciency into its plans (Ministry of Finance of Russia 2015). Among the measures planned and introduced are an increased tax burden on luxury real property and vehicles, the replacement of the corporate property tax with a corporate realestate tax and the introduction of CFC rules.
While every sovereign country has the full right to develop its own policy in any area, the fact that the mentioned countries joined into an economic union suggests that their economy-related policies should be at least coordinated. Indeed, the EAEU predecessors implicitly acknowledged harmonized tax policy as one of their goals.
3 . However, the Treaty on EAEU provides for a coordinated (and potentially harmonized) macroeconomic policy, policies on cross-border trade, customs and relevant controls, as well as a policy on the exchange of information among state bodies -but not for the coordination of tax policies. Apparently, EAEU Member States are free to compete using them -which may potentially distort the business environment.
In fact, three of the reviewed tax-policy documents 4 mentioned the membership of the respective countries in an economic block, while none ever provided for tax-policy harmonization. Th e Armenian policy openly refers to improving the country's competitiveness; Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia explicitly stated their intentions of attracting the investments and promoting the domestic entrepreneurship -which also means tax competition. Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic, having weaker economies and insuffi cient budget revenues, aim at the improvement of fi scal function and tax administration, which puts them at a certain disadvantage on he scale of a larger common market of EAEU.
Th e review of main tax policy points leads to the following observations and conclusions:
• EAEU Member States commonly aim at the improvement of tax administration, including VAT issues;
• Th e tax policies of EAEU Member States do not consider the EAEU obligations or any other aspect of international cooperation, so, while complying with the Treaty on EAEU, every country pursues its own tax policy goals in all other areas -up to the abolishment of VAT in Kazakhstan;
• Th ere is no consistency in the timeframe of developing and publishing tax policies: Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic develop them within their general economic strategy, Belarus does not publish any up-to-date plans (though they exist for internal use), in Kazakhstan the President sets the strategic targets and the Government and National Bank prepare the short-term plans once every few years, Russia prepares a dedicated document every year for the upcoming three-year period;
• Only in Russia does the Ministry of Finance report on the implementation of the tax policy into the tax system on an annual basis (within the Main directions of tax policy), whereas in other countries the offi cers of the tax authorities report on the implementation on an ad-hoc basis, usually at roundtables or during interviews.
Despite the harmonization of certain indirect tax issues at the level of the Agreement on principles of levying of indirect taxes (2008), a few items remained unsettled (Golodova and Ranchinskaya 2012) 5 :
• Customs Union regulations provide no guidance regarding which works and services may be related to the movable and immovable property (important to determine the place of supply), and the domestic rules diff er in this respect;
• Russia demands that the owner of imported goods pays VAT, while Belarus and Kazakhstan allows the trade agent to do it;
• Domestic rules on documentation and procedures sometimes deviate from the union rules.
Such inconsistency in approaches to tax policies implies a signifi cant divergence in policy-making and complicates the assessment of how successful and how (in)congruent they are. Th ese tax policies also show that despite public talks of the necessity of tax harmonization the EAEU Member States hardly intend to make any moves towards it beyond minimal compliance with obligations under treaties, thus maintaining the divergence of both tax policies and tax systems. Moreover, the analysis of the tax policies suggests the existence of a certain degree of tax competition within EAEU.
Analysis of VAT trends in EAEU member states
VAT is a unique tax, the statistics on which may provide an interesting insight into the structure of the trade and the creation of value added due to four factors:
• First, it is a central-level tax, fully regulated at the topmost level of the country administrative structure (and fully contributing to the central budget);
• Second, EAEU Member States achieved a certain convergence of VAT (same VAT model, similar to the EU one; same tax rates for import and domestic trade; taxation-at-destination principle; 0 % rate for export; taxation of most transactions; similar lists of exempted operations -public services, fi nancial services, certain socially important goods and services and micro-businesses) and certain harmonization (administration of intra-union transactions);
• Th ird, use of the same rates of VAT for import and domestic trade makes feasible the comparison of the two amounts;
• Fourth, the deduction of incoming VAT from VAT on sales results in the fact that the tax proceeds to the budget are proportionate to value created (added) by the local industry.
Th ese factors result in VAT proceeds corresponding to the trends in import and in value added by the local enterprises. Figure 1 shows the dynamics of VAT collection in fi ve EAEU Member States as a percentage of GDP of respective countries. Th e Kyrgyz Republic made available detailed statistics only from 2009, and Armenia and Belarus disclosed it to the Eurasian Economic Commission only from 2010. Th e gray lines on the graphs show the overall VAT burden. Th e dotted lines on the graphs show the amounts of VAT proceeds from the supply of goods and services within the territory of the respective countries, and the solid lines show the amounts of VAT imposed on the imports of goods into the territory of the respective countries.
Th e dynamics of these lines suggests the following.
Four countries show VAT proceeds from import activities consistently exceeding those from domestic trade. In Armenia the proceeds from "domestic" VAT has a distinct upward trend from 2010 to 2015 (from 3.3 % to 4.6 % of GDP). Considering that the country did not change the VAT rate, this suggest either an improvement of domestic production (higher value added leads to higher VAT contributions) or a worsening of VAT administration (denial of VAT off set or postponing VAT reimbursement).
In Belarus the proceeds from the "domestic" VAT are negative (with the exception of 2014, when it contributed 0.17 % of GDP to the budget), though the Eurasian Economic Commission (2013) reports that "domestic" VAT was positive before off set or reimbursement of respective amounts of incoming VAT to the taxpayers. Th is suggests that the Belarusian industry is extremely export-oriented (export sales eligible for 0 % VAT signifi cantly exceed domestic sales).
In Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic "import" VAT consistently exceeds "domestic" VAT, but the proceeds from "domestic" VAT are relatively stable, fl uctuating around 0.8 % of GDP in the fi rst case and around 2.1 % of GDP in the sec- • increase of non-VAT-able transactions (either legally, e.g. by an increased share of exempt transactions, or illegally, e.g. by a spread of shadow economy). Abramov and Kashin (2016) report a huge VAT non-compliance gap;
• lower value added (economy becomes oriented to simpler transactions). However, the offi cial statistics did not report any drastic shrinkage of the producing sectors;
• higher reimbursement of VAT for exporters (economy becomes more dependent on export). A possible option, considering similar fi ndings in Kazakhstan. Abramov and Kashin (2016) also report that reimbursement of VAT for exporters is infl ated due to tax fraud.
Russia is the only one of the reviewed countries where the tax authorities publicly report the usage of certain tax benefi ts -in particular VAT exemptions. Art. 149 of the Russian Tax Code (TC RF) lists the operations exempted from VAT throughout the territory of Russia, including the supply of certain medical goods and most medical services, education and child-care services, cultural services, incity transportation, supply of utilities, rent and sale of living premises, supply of IP, fi nancial services (banking, depositary, clearing, insurance and similar), sale of shares and services of public authorities. However, the taxpayers must report on the exempt turnover, and the Federal Tax Service tracks these exempt amounts as well and publishes them as the Annex to Form 1-НДС "Report on Structure of Tax Accruals for Value Added Tax". Th e analysis of amounts underreceived due to VAT benefi ts shows that in 2014 97.7 % of them were due to fi nancial operations, including:
• sale of shares in the companies (Art.149.2.12 of TC RF) -14.49 % of total amount;
• bank operations (Art.149.3.3 of TC RF) -14.94 % of total amount; and
• loan and REPO operations (Art.149.3.15 of TC RF) -67.25 % of total amount.
Art.135 of Council Directive 2006 / 112 / EC on the common system of value added tax also provides for the exemption of these operations, thus making Russian regulations in line with the European ones. However, speaking of economic environment, these statistics may be interpreted as follows:
• exempt operations in 2014 totaled 1.49 times VAT-able operations; and • 67.25 % of the exempt operations in 2014 were loans and REPO operations, meaning the remuneration for them equals a total of VAT-able operations; meaning
• an amount of remuneration for loans and REPO operations (a tax base for potential but underreceived VAT) equals the taxable value added in all other industries; and
• the amounts of remuneration for bank operations and sales of shares equal 22 % of the taxable value added in all other industries each.
Th us, in the case of Russia, VAT data signals that debt-fi nancing clearly dominates in the Russian economy. Considering that Russian banks off er business-tobusiness loans at around 15 % p.a., thus making them very expensive even without VAT, the Russian companies (especially the large ones) seek for credit abroad, where they may obtain the loans at much lower interest rates, usually via a chain of specialpurpose vehicles, which may result in profi t-shift ing to other jurisdictions. Th us VAT shows the direction for further investigation of capital outfl ow from Russia, for developing the measures for replacement of debt-fi nancing with foreign direct investment -and for a potential but yet unused tax base (e.g. tax on transactions with the fi nancial instruments).
A second trend apparent from Figure 1 are the relative volumes of imported and domestic goods and services. In Russia, some researchers (Ternopolskaya et al. 2015) note that the previously high domestic value added came close to the volume of import: while the share of VAT on imports in GDP stayed steadily around 2.5 % of GDP, the trend of VAT collected on domestic transactions generally goes downwards. Th is highlights a slowing-down in the development of the Russian economy.
From this standpoint, the situation in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic is much worse: by 2015, the "import" VAT exceeded "domestic" VAT 2.4-fold in the fi rst case (decrease from 4.0-fold) and 2.6-fold in the second case (increase from 1.9-fold). In absolute terms, "import" VAT in Kazakhstan dropped by 2.2 % of GDP over 2005 -2014 , and in the Kyrgyz Republic it rose by 1.6 % of GDP over 2009 -2014. With relatively stable proceeds from "domestic" VAT this suggests a signifi cant dependence on imported goods (and insuffi cient supply of domestic goods).
For Armenia and Belarus, this conclusion cannot be made with certainty. In Armenia, over 2010 -2014 the "domestic" VAT constituted 36.9 % to 39.3 % of "import" VAT, being relatively stable. In 2015, the "domestic" VAT exceeded the "import" VAT, but further dynamics are yet unknown. In Belarus, the negative fi gures of VAT suggest their distortion by external factors.
An international comparison would suggest whether "import" VAT exceeds the "domestic" one in other countries, and whether this aff ects the respective economies in a positive or negative way.
Analysis of VAT trends in third countries
Th e research showed that only some countries publish the information on VAT proceeds with a breakdown between "domestic" and "import" amounts. 8 Eurostat and most countries, apparently following the UN approach, present in their fi scal statistics only the generalized D211 category "Value added type taxes" (as per UN System of National Accounts 2008), with no breakdown for "import" and "domestic" proceeds.
However, Ireland, the Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain and Switzerland publish such a breakdown. Figures 2 -6 show the dynamics of "domestic" and "import" VAT over the last decade, based on a series of reports published by respective tax authorities.
In three reviewed cases (Ireland, South Africa and Spain), net proceeds of "domestic VAT" consistently (and signifi cantly) exceed those of "import" VAT. Th e latter is relatively stable in these three countries, suggesting a smaller dependence on import and its constant volume.
In Ireland, the "import" VAT fl uctuated between 0.58 % and 0.84 % of GDP, while "domestic" VAT fell from 6.42 % to 4.83 % of GDP, the majority of reduction happening over 2008 -2011. Considering that Ireland is an island nation, its economy either produces signifi cant added value or is based on the services with place of supply in Ireland. Th e stabilization of "domestic" VAT and the slight increase of "import" VAT from 2012 onwards may be partially attributed to the increase of the statutory rate (from 21 % to 23 %).
In the case of Slovakia, both components fl uctuate between 2.23 % and 3.72 % of GDP with occasional dominance of either. Th is may be interpreted as a significant inclusion of Slovakia into international trade and the division of labor. While it increased VAT rate from 19 % to 20 % in 2011, this had little (if any) impact on trade trends.
In South Africa, the "domestic" VAT exceeds "import" VAT 2.1 -2.6-fold, and both have slowly been increasing since 2009. Considering the stable VAT rate of 14 %, this suggests steady economic development. Switzerland is the only country in this comparison, where the "import" VAT consistently exceeds the "domestic VAT" 1.2 -1.6-fold in 2005 -2008 , and 1.15-fold from 2010, or by 0.25 % of GDP. Th e increase of the VAT rate from 7.6 % to 8 % from 2011 resulted in a slight elevation of the total VAT burden but did not change the situation drastically.
However, even the examples of Slovakia and Switzerland are not comparable with those of EAEU Member States, where "import" VAT exceeds the "domestic" one 1.5 -2.6-fold (not counting Belarus with a negative net amount of "domestic" VAT). 
Structure of import and export and countries' dependencies
Let's analyze further the structure of import and export for the same countries: the main items of import would show the potential dependence of the country, while the main items of export (which is subject to a 0 % VAT rate) would show which industries demand the reimbursement of incoming VAT, thus reducing the VAT proceeds. Tables 1 and 2 show the breakdown of the main items of import and export, according to the offi cial statistics of the same countries: fi ve EAEU Member States, Ireland, the Slovak Republic, Spain, South Africa and Switzerland. Th e data presented are for 2014, but the listed groups of goods generally remained the same in previous years.
Table 1
Main items of export and import of EAEU Member States in 2014, in percentage of total export or import Export Import
Armenia
Metal ores (mostly copper, zinc, precious metals, molybdenum; 18.8 %) Pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals & articles thereof (mostly diamonds, gold and jewelry; 14.9 %) Primary iron semiproducts (7.1 %) Beverages, vinegar, alcohol and ethyl spirit (12.2 %) Tobacco products (7.5 %) Raw aluminum and aluminum articles (6.0 %) Energy products (mostly gas and electricity; 5.6 %) Raw copper and its products (4.9 %) Energy products (mostly oil, petrol products, gas and electricity (19.0 %) Machinery and equipment (9.0 %) Motor vehicles and spare parts (7.8 %) Pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals & articles thereof (mostly diamonds and gold; 6.9 %) Electric equipment and spare parts (4.5 %) Polymers and plastic products (2.9 %) Grain (2.8 %) Medicines and medical products (2.7 %) Th e common feature of four EAEU Member States (except Belarus) is a signifi cant share of natural resources (with lower shares of other goods) in the total export volume: metal ores and semiproducts in Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic and hydrocarbons and metals in Kazakhstan and Russia. In other words, these countries mostly export products with lower value added. Belarus, however, mostly exports petrol products and chemical products, manufactured from local or imported raw materials (mainly from Russia).
Belarus
Among the imports the common feature for all EAEU Member States is a high share of products with higher value added (commonly machinery, chemical products and foodstuff ). Th is is consistent with the large proceeds of "import" VAT in comparison to "domestic" VAT as shown in Figure 1 .
Th is information on structure of trade, together with the fi ndings of the Kazakhstani Accounts Committee (2013), suggests a fi scal drawback of dependence on resource industries: while exporting the natural resources (i.e. products with low value added), the respective industries demand reimbursement of incoming VAT, thus reducing the public fi nance available for the state-wide programs of the central authorities. Kazakhstani policymakers suggested the replacement of VAT with a sales tax to counter this eff ect and increase tax revenues. Russian policymakers preferred considerations whether to deny the deductibility of incoming VAT for exporters of mineral resources.
Belarus poses a diff erent question: while its exporting industry mostly consists of petrol refi neries, chemicals manufacturers and machinery producers, these industries de facto receive "subsidies" in form of a VAT refund -which is not the case for other EAEU Member States. Th us, Belarusian business with higher value added is probably in more benefi cial conditions than in other countries, which may distort the common market. Th is is a defi nite call for other Member States to support their manufacturing business -which, in the future, should simplify the countries' sustainable development.
Besides, the 2.4 -2.6-fold excess of "import" VAT over "domestic" VAT in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic marks a huge dependence of the country on imported goods with high value added. In light of the recently severely weakened currencies of EAEU Member States the imported goods (the prices of which are commonly expressed in US dollars or euros) became very expensive, so the demand for them falls (in favor of the cheaper analogs, if the goods are truly necessary). Th is triggers both a decrease of quality of life and -in the short-term perspective -a reduction of the overall VAT revenues.
On the contrary, the import and export of Ireland, the Slovak Republic, Spain and Switzerland consist of the similar groups of goods, mostly with high value added (see Table 2 ). South Africa, however, performs closer to Russia, featuring a signifi cant amount of exported natural resources -but also importing suffi cient amounts of those. In Switzerland, about one quarter of both import and export con-sists of precious metals, stones and articles thereof, which suggests active trade in these with other countries, apart from importing materials for further processing.
Th is more balanced structure of cross-border trade corresponds with the amount of "domestic" VAT proceeds being almost equal or higher that the amount of "import" VAT proceeds. 
Policy lessons
Th is paper explores the potential of the signal function of the taxes using taxpolicy documents and statistics on VAT and cross-border trade. Th e analysis of these data highlights the favorable and / or unfavorable trends in the economic environment and policy development, suggesting the focus points of policymaking for the future periods.
If we have to consider the trends in an economic block, such an analysis requires the comparable data for all its member states. Eurostat, for instance, annually publishes the reports "Taxation Trends in the European Union", disclosing the same tax information for all EU Member States, Iceland and Norway (and, apparently, the national tax authorities prepare this information in a standardized way). However, the EAEU Member States publish tax statistics with diff erent degrees of details: from the annual amounts of tax revenues of the central budget broken down by taxes in Belarus to the detailed statistics on taxpayers, tax base, tax accruals etc. in Russia. Th is complicates the comparison of countries' trends and achievements, so the Eurasian Economic Commission 10 in 2016 started to publish limited tax statistics (structure of tax revenues, breakdown of VAT and excise proceeds) in a common format to ensure the consistency of data (Eurasian Economic Commission 2016). However, these statistics date back to 2010 only, and in absence of disclosures from the national authorities for a longer period a reliable econometric analysis is not yet feasible.
But even in the current EAEU environment a certain analysis is possible: for instance, we may see that the VAT on import in four EAEU Member States signifi cantly exceeds the VAT on domestic transactions, while three of these countries export resources and import goods with high value added. VAT eff ectiveness may be aff ected by either a policy gap or a non-compliance gap (Adamczyk 2015) , so there are two possibilities, both of which should attract the immediate attention of the policymakers: severe country dependence on imported products (which is the policy gap and a sustainability issue) or domestic tax fraud (which is the non-compliance gap and an administrative issue). Th e same is essentially correct for Russia, which experienced a signifi cant decrease in VAT collection on domestic transactions in 2005 -2008 , though a dependence of Russia on import is less crucial. So all these countries need to revise their respective economic policies.
A comparison with other countries which publish a breakdown of VAT proceeds for domestic trade and import suggests that the signifi cant excess of "import" VAT over "domestic" VAT (more than 1.5-fold) is not common. It should be noted that the statistics shows net "domestic" VAT that is aft er off set or refund of incoming VAT for domestic exporters. Th e comparison of the structure of import and export of EAEU Member States and third countries suggests that EAEU exporters which mainly benefi t from VAT refund are resource producers: in other words, the central governments "subsidize" this industry, but not so much those producing higher added value. Belarus is an exception here, but it presents another issue: its businesses are probably not in the same conditions as their competitors in other EAEU Member States due to such "subsidy", so the levelled condition on the common market are yet to be achieved.
In addition, the VAT declarations in EAEU Member States require the businesses to report on both VAT-able and exempt turnover, but only Russia publishes the information on exempt turnover, making feasible the analysis of tax-benefi ts effi ciency. All EAEU Member States enacted extensive lists of exempt transactions, but above we saw that in Russia 97.7 % of exempted amounts were for fi nancial transactions, and only 2.3 % were for other operations, including socially important ones. While all EAEU Member States pronounced recently that a revision of tax benefi ts is necessary, none of them performed any regular analysis of tax-benefi ts effi ciency, and it is not publicly known whether the country's economy benefi ted to any extent from these amounts left at the disposal of the companies. It may be benefi cial for all EAEU Member States to perform a regular assessment of tax-benefi ts effi ciency, as Russia planned for 2016 -2018, and introduce the benefi ts on a temporary basis with the possibility of subsequent prolongation. Th is latter option could benefi t the business decision-making, off ering a more predictable environment for planning.
